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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 For this installment of the Recent Developments, we examine re-
cent decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and the Flor-
ida Supreme Court. The opening Note examines the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (Gonza-
les II),1 where the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a party protected under a 
restraining order a legitimate claim of entitlement to enforcement of 
the restraining order.2 The second Note examines the United States 
                                                                                                                      
 1. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 2. Amanda Quirke contributed this Note. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II),3 
where the Court held that a city’s exercise of eminent domain power 
in furtherance of an economic development plan satisfies the consti-
tutional “public use” requirement.4  
 Our coverage of recent Florida Supreme Court decisions begins 
with American Home Assurance Co. v. National Railroad Passenger 
Corp.,5 where the court answered certified questions from the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals involving the proper application of 
Florida statutes governing comparative fault and restrictions on the 
waiver of sovereign immunity.6 Our Florida Supreme Court coverage 
continues with Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum (Boca Burger II),7 which 
held that a plaintiff has an absolute right to amend its complaint 
once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served and 
a trial court has no discretion to deny such an amendment; a defen-
dant may assert an affirmative defense, including the defense of fed-
eral preemption, in a motion to dismiss; and an appellate court may, 
in “appropriate circumstances,” impose sanctions on an appellee or 
its lawyer for the frivolous defense of a patently erroneous trial court 
order.8 Our final Note examines Sunset Harbour Condominium Ass’n 
v. Robbins,9 where the Florida Supreme Court held that a state stat-
ute prohibiting assessment of value for the tax year on real property 
improvements not substantially completed on January 1 comports 
with the Florida Constitution’s just valuation requirement.10 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—A PROTECTED PARTY HAS NO LEGITIMATE 
CLAIM OF ENTITLEMENT TO ENFORCEMENT OF A RESTRAINING ORDER 
WHICH WOULD BE PROTECTED UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales 
(Gonzales II), 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).  
 Respondent, Gonzales, claimed the Town of Castle Rock violated 
her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based on 
the police department’s failure to enforce a restraining order against 
her husband.11 Gonzales claimed the Town of Castle Rock deprived 
her of her property interest in the enforcement of the restraining or-
der without due process because the police department had “an offi-
cial policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of 
                                                                                                                      
 3. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 4. Melinda Parks contributed this Note. 
 5. 908 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2005). 
 6. Maureen Walterbach contributed this Note. 
 7. 912 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2005). 
 8. Jessica Slatten contributed this Note. 
 9. 914 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2005). 
 10. Richard Junnier contributed this Note. 
 11. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (Gonzales II), 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2800 (2005). 
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restraining order violations” and “tolerate[d] the non-enforcement of 
restraining orders by its police officers.”12 The Tenth Circuit held 
Gonzales had a protected property interest in the enforcement of the 
restraining order and the town deprived her of due process based on 
the police department’s failure to take her seriously and enforce the 
restraining order.13 On appeal by the Town of Castle Rock, the Su-
preme Court reversed and found Gonzales has no protected property 
interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.14  
 Respondent obtained a restraining order against her husband in 
conjunction with a divorce proceeding.15 On June 22, 1999, respon-
dent realized her three daughters were missing from the yard of the 
family home and notified the police department at 7:30 p.m.16 Gonza-
les, suspecting her husband had taken the girls, showed the officers a 
copy of the restraining order, but the officers stated “there was noth-
ing they could do” and instructed her to call the police department if 
the children did not return home by 10:00 p.m.17 Gonzales talked to 
her husband on his cell phone at 8:30 p.m., in which he informed her 
that he and the girls were at an amusement park in Denver.18 Gonza-
les called the police again and asked if they would check for her hus-
band at the amusement park or put out an all points bulletin for her 
husband.19 The police again suggested she should wait until 10:00 
p.m. to see if her husband would return her daughters.20  
 She contacted the police at 10:10 p.m. but was instructed to wait 
until midnight.21 After finding nobody at her husband’s apartment, 
she called the police at 12:10 a.m. and was instructed to wait for an 
officer to arrive.22 The officer never came to the apartment, so she 
went to the police station at 12:50 a.m., where she was ignored.23 At 
3:20 a.m., her husband went to the police station and opened fire 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Id. at 2802 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. at 129(a), Gonzales II, 125 
S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04-278)). 
 13. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock (Gonzales I), 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), va-
cated, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). 
 14. Gonzales II, 125 S. Ct. at 2810-11.  
 15. Id. at 2800. 
 16. Id. at 2801. 
 17. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. at 126(a), Gonzales II, 125 S. Ct. 
2796 (No. 04-278)). 
  18. Id. 
  19. Id. at 2801-02. 
  20. Id. at 2802. 
  21. Id.  
  22. Id.  
  23. Id.  
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with a semiautomatic handgun.24 He was killed by return fire from 
the police.25 All three daughters were found dead in his truck.26  
 The issue addressed by the Supreme Court is whether Gonzales 
has an interest in the enforcement of a restraining order which is 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 
“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have 
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than 
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to it.”28 An entitlement is created from “an inde-
pendent source such as state law.”29 However, “[a]lthough the under-
lying substantive interest is created by ‘an independent source such 
as state law,’ federal constitutional law determines whether that in-
terest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected 
by the Due Process Clause.”30 
 The Tenth Circuit found that Colorado law created an entitlement 
based on the language printed on the restraining order31 and a state 
statute requiring enforcement under certain conditions.32  The Tenth 
Circuit focused on the mandatory language in the Colorado statute, 
including a requirement that “[a] peace officer shall arrest” and 
“shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order.”33 
The Tenth Circuit also found that the legislative intent behind the 
statute was “to alter the fact that the police were not enforcing do-
mestic abuse restraining orders” and that any other interpretation 
“would render domestic abuse restraining orders utterly valueless.”34 
                                                                                                                      
  24. Id.  
  25. Id.  
  26. Id.  
  27. Id. at 2803. 
  28. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
  29. Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976)).  
  30. Id. at 2803-04 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 10 
(1978)). 
  31. The language printed on the back of the restraining order contained an instruc-
tion to law enforcement officials stating:  
YOU SHALL USE EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS 
RESTRAINING ORDER. YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST WOULD 
BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A WARRANT 
FOR THE ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE 
INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE 
RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED TO VIOLATE 
ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER AND THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS 
BEEN PROPERLY SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS ORDER OR HAS 
RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS ORDER. 
Id. at 2801. 
  32. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock (Gonzales I), 366 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004); 
see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3) (2001). 
  33. Gonzales I, 366 F.3d at 1104 (emphasis added) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-
803.5(3) (2001)). 
  34. Id. at 1108-09. 
2005]                          RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 531 
 
 Contrary to the findings of the Tenth Circuit, the majority found 
the Colorado statute did not create an entitlement because it did not 
impose a mandatory requirement to enforce restraining orders.35 This 
interpretation reconciled the statutory language with the “deep-
rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion, even in the presence of 
seemingly mandatory legislative commands.”36 Under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “a benefit is not a pro-
tected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in 
their discretion.”37  
 The majority also found that obligations of the police department 
are different when the subject of the order is not present, noting the 
fact that Gonzales’s husband was not present and his whereabouts 
were unknown.38 Citing other cases which found that an arrest may 
be impossible when the alleged abuser is not at the home, the Court 
found the Colorado statute contemplated this situation by including 
a provision that only required an officer to “seek a warrant for the 
arrest” when an arrest would be “impractical” under the circum-
stances.39 Gonzales did not clearly identify whether she was entitled 
to having her husband arrested, having the police seek a warrant, or 
having them use reasonable means to enforce the restraining order.40 
“Such indeterminacy is not the hallmark of a duty that is mandatory. 
Nor can someone be safely deemed ‘entitled’ to something when the 
identity of the alleged entitlement is vague.”41  
 The Supreme Court also found that even if there were an entitle-
ment created under the Colorado statute, it may not create a prop-
erty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.42 The Court found the right to the enforcement of a re-
straining order does not “have some ascertainable monetary value” 
and thus is not property under the “Roth-type property-as-
entitlement” line of cases.43 The property interest claimed by Gonza-
les arises incidentally from the government function of arresting 
people who it has probable cause to believe have committed a crime.44 
                                                                                                                      
  35. Gonzales II, 125 S. Ct. at 2805. 
 36. Id. at 2806. 
 37. Id. at 2803. 
 38. Id. at 2807. The dissent disagrees with this fact, instead asserting the “ ‘scene’ of 
the violation was wherever the husband was currently holding the daughters, [so] this case 
does not implicate the question of an officer’s duties to arrest a person who has left the 
scene and is no longer in violation of the restraining order.” Id. at 2820 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).  
 39. Id. at 2807 (majority opinion) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (2001)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2809.  
 43. Id. See generally Thomas W. Merill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 
VA. L. REV. 885, 964 (2000). 
 44. Gonzales II, 125 S. Ct. at 2810. 
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“[A]n indirect and incidental result of the Government’s enforcement 
action . . . does not amount to a deprivation of any interest in life, 
liberty, or property.”45  
 In the concurrence, Justice Souter found that another flaw is 
Gonzales’s claim to a property interest in a state mandated process.46 
He cited precedent which said that “[p]rocess is not an end in itself. 
Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to 
which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.”47 Thus, 
the Court has always made a distinction between a substantive in-
terest and the process required by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to protect that interest. Finding that Gonza-
les had a property interest in the enforcement of the restraining or-
der would “collaps[e] the distinction between property protected and 
the process that protects it.”48 
 The dissent found that there is an entitlement to enforcement of 
restraining orders because in the domestic violence context, police 
discretion is removed and enforcement is mandatory.49 Justice Ste-
vens discredited the majority’s position that since Gonzales failed to 
specify what police action she was entitled to, that the police action 
cannot be mandatory.50 Stevens treated the statute as requiring 
mandatory enforcement, whether it is to arrest the alleged offender, 
seek a warrant, or use reasonable means to enforce the restraining 
order.51  
 Focusing on the particular context of the restraining order in this 
case, Justice Stevens noted that Colorado was one of many states 
that passed mandatory arrest statutes in the mid-1990s to take “aim 
at the crisis of police underenforcement in the domestic violence 
sphere.”52 “The purpose of these statutes was precisely to ‘counter po-
lice resistance to arrests in domestic violence cases by removing or 
                                                                                                                      
 45. Id. (quoting O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 787 (1980)). 
 46. Id. at 2812 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 47. Id. (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983)). 
 48. Id.  
 49. Prior to its analysis of the case, the dissenting opinion takes issue with the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of Colorado law in conflict with the Tenth Circuit, because 
the Supreme Court should defer to “the views of a federal court as to the law of a State 
within its jurisdiction” unless the decision is “clearly wrong.” Id. at 2814 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 542 U.S. 156, 167 (1998)). The dissent 
suggests a proper method would have been to certify the question to the Colorado Supreme 
Court in alignment with the principles of federalism, to “avoid[] the unnecessary adjudica-
tion of difficult questions of constitutional law” and to promote “judicial economy and fair-
ness to the parties.” Id. at 2816. 
  50. Id. at 2819. 
  51. Id. at 2819-20. 
  52. Id. at 2817. Studies during that time period showed police officers only arrested al-
leged abusers three to ten percent of the time, and thirteen percent of the time when the vic-
tim had visible injuries. Id. at 2818 (citing Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step 
Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, but Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 542).  
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restricting police officer discretion; mandatory arrest policies would 
increase police response and reduce batterer recidivism.’ ”53 
 Justice Stevens also rejected the majority’s rigid view of property 
as something that has some ascertainable monetary value, noting 
that “our cases have found ‘property’ interests in a number of state-
conferred benefits and services.”54 In addition, the dissent analogized 
Gonzales’s interest in enforcement of the restraining order to a pri-
vate contract for security services, which has “some ascertainable 
monetary value” and would certainly qualify as a property interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 
“The fact that it is based on a statutory enactment and a judicial or-
der entered for her special protection, rather than on a formal con-
tract, does not provide a principled basis for refusing to consider it 
‘property’ worthy of constitutional protection.”56 
 Justice Stevens’s dissent focused more on the context and facts of 
the case to find the Colorado statute imposed a mandatory require-
ment for police to enforce the restraining order. “[T]he crucial point is 
that, under the statute, the police were required to provide enforce-
ment; they lacked the discretion to do nothing.”57 Thus, in Justice 
Stevens’s view, since Gonzales “had a property interest in the en-
forcement of the restraining order, state officials could not deprive 
her of that interest without observing fair procedures.”58 
 In contrast, the majority focused on the discretion vested in a po-
lice officer to enforce a restraining order; it found Gonzales did not 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement and thus had no property in-
terest which would be protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, a protected party has no cause of 
action against a police department for failure to enforce a restraining 
order, as the benefit that a third party may receive from having 
someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protec-
tions under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in 
its “substantive” manifestations. This result reflects our continuing 
reluctance to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as “a font of tort 
law.”59  
                                                                                                                      
 53. Id. at 2817 (quoting Emily Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for 
the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1670). 
 54. Id. at 2822. 
 55. Id. at 2823 n.19. 
 56. Id. at 2823-44. 
 57. Id. at 2819-20. 
 58. Id. at 2824. Alluding to the tragic facts of this particular case, Stevens notes, “At 
the very least, due process requires that the relevant state decisionmaker listen to the 
claimant and then apply the relevant criteria in reaching his decision.” Id. 
 59. Id. at 2810 (majority opinion). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—A CITY’S EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
POWER IN FURTHERANCE OF AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
SATISFIES CONSTITUTIONAL “PUBLIC USE” REQUIREMENT—Kelo v. 
City of New London (Kelo II), 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 In December 2000, nine petitioners brought an action in the New 
London Superior Court60 claiming that the taking of their properties 
by the City of New London for economic development purposes vio-
lated the “public use” restriction in the Fifth Amendment of the Con-
stitution.61 The superior court granted petitioners’ request for per-
manent injunctive relief for a portion of the property included in peti-
tioners’ complaint. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld 
the taking as constitutional, concluding that “economic development 
projects created and implemented . . . that have the public economic 
benefits of creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues, and 
contributing to urban revitalization, satisfy the public use clauses of 
the state and federal constitutions.”62 On appeal, the Supreme Court 
affirmed.63 
 The City of New London (“City”), a “distressed municipality,” was 
targeted for economic revitalization because of high unemployment 
and a decline in total population throughout the 1990s.64 In the 
search for some form of economic development, city leaders resur-
rected the private, nonprofit New London Development Corporation 
(NLDC) and authorized a $5.35 million bond issue to support its 
planning activities.65 Additionally, the City hoped to benefit from the 
erection of a $300 million research facility by pharmaceutical com-
pany Pfizer Inc.66  
                                                                                                                      
 60. See Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005).   
 61. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of the above quoted clause’s applicability to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).   
 62. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo I), 843 A.2d 500, 520 (Conn. 2004). 
 63. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2669. 
 64. Id. at 2658. In 1996, more than 1500 people lost jobs as a result of the federal gov-
ernment closing the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Fort Trumbull. Id. In 1998, the 
City’s unemployment rate was almost double that of the State. Id. A population of slightly 
less than 24,000 was the City’s lowest since 1920. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2659. The NLDC was originally created in 1978 to aid the City with eco-
nomic development. Kelo I, 843 A.2d at 508. The statutory provision authorizing such crea-
tion states in pertinent part: “Any municipality which has a planning commission is au-
thorized, by vote of its legislative body, to designate the economic development commission 
or the redevelopment agency of such municipality or a nonprofit development corporation 
as its development agency and exercise through such agency the powers granted under this 
chapter . . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-188 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Supplement).  
 66. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. In 1998, Pfizer Inc. announced plans to develop a global 
research facility on a site adjacent to the Fort Trumbull area. Kelo I, 843 A.2d at 508.  
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 In 2000, the City approved an NLDC development plan67 that was 
“projected to create in excess of 1000 jobs, to increase tax and other 
revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including 
its downtown and waterfront areas.”68 The NLDC plan focused on 
ninety acres in the Fort Trumbull area of New London and encom-
passed seven parcels intended to “capitalize on the arrival of the 
Pfizer facility and the new commerce it was expected to attract” and 
to “make the City more attractive and . . . create leisure and recrea-
tional opportunities on the waterfront and in the park.”69 To accom-
plish its plan, NLDC was authorized by the City to use eminent do-
main, if necessary, to acquire the needed land.70 After successfully 
purchasing most of the real estate in the ninety-acre area, negotia-
tions with petitioners failed.71 
 Petitioner Kelo bought her Fort Trumbull waterfront house in 
1997 and has since made extensive improvements.72 Petitioner “Dery 
was born in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and has lived there” 
ever since, including sixty years with her current husband.73 Overall, 
nine petitioners owned fifteen properties in Fort Trumbull, which 
were either owner-occupied or held for investment purposes.74 Four 
properties were in Parcel 3 of the development plan, and eleven were 
in Parcel 4A.75 There was no evidence that any of these properties 
were blighted or in poor condition; rather, as petitioners allege, they 
were the subject of condemnation “only because they happen to be lo-
cated in the development area.”76  
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether a 
city’s decision to take property for the purpose of economic develop-
                                                                                                                      
 67. Economic, environmental, and social ramifications were studied. Kelo II, 125 S. 
Ct. at 2659 n.2. Six alternative development proposals were evaluated with an ultimate 
conclusion by the Office of Planning and Management that the project was within state 
and municipal development policies.  Id. 
 68. Kelo I, 843 A.2d at 507. 
 69. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. Parcel 1 is designated for a waterfront conference hotel 
that will include restaurants, shopping and marinas; Parcel 2 will have eighty new resi-
dences and space for a new U.S. Coast Guard Museum; Parcel 3 is located immediately 
north of the Pfizer facility with 90,000 square feet of research and development office 
space; Parcel 4A will be used to either support the adjacent state park with parking or re-
tail services or to support the marina; Parcel 4B will include a renovated marina and the 
final stretch of the riverwalk; Parcels 5, 6, and 7 will provide land for office and retail 
space, parking and water-dependent commercial uses. Id.  
 70. Id. at 2660. The statute relied on by the City states in pertinent part that “[t]he 
development agency may, with the approval of the legislative body, and in the name of the 
municipality, acquire by eminent domain real property located within the project area.” 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-193(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Supplement).  
 71. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
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ment satisfies the ‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment.”77 Relying heavily on its previous decisions in Berman v. 
Parker78 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,79 a 5-4 Court 
found for the City.80 The Court’s holding stands for the proposition 
that modern eminent domain law does not distinguish between pub-
lic use and public purpose. 
 The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that “the sover-
eign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transfer-
ring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just com-
pensation.”81 However, “it is equally clear that a State may transfer 
property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the pub-
lic’ is the purpose of the taking.”82 The Court, though, relied on nei-
ther of these propositions to dispose of the case.83 Instead, the Court 
broadened the issue to “whether the City’s development plan serves a 
‘public purpose’ ”84 and discussed at length cases supporting the 
Court’s rejection of “any literal requirement that condemned prop-
erty be put into use for the general public.”85  
 First, in Berman, the Court upheld the exercise of eminent do-
main to condemn a department store, itself unblighted, located in a 
blighted area of Washington, D.C.86 The condemnation was in accor-
dance with a redevelopment plan authorized by statute.87 To justify 
condemning the thriving department store, the Court explained that 
“community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Con-
stitution, be on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by building.”88 
                                                                                                                      
 77. Id. at 2661.  
 78. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 79. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 80. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion, Justice Kennedy concurred with an opinion, and 
Justice O’Connor dissented with an opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas joined. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. 
 81. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2661. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 2663 (emphasis added).  
 85. Id. at 2662 (emphasis added) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 
244 (1984)). 
 86. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  
 87. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, 60 Stat. 790 (1946). Section 2 of 
the Act made a “legislative determination”: 
[O]wing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-out, and other 
factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with respect to substan-
dard housing and blighted areas, including the use of buildings in alleys as 
dwellings for human habitation, are injurious to the public health, safety, mor-
als, and welfare; and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States 
to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of Government 
by eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary 
and appropriate for the purpose . . . . 
§ 2. The Act neither defined “slums” nor “blighted areas.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 n.1.   
 88. Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.  
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Instead, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, announced “[i]t is 
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community 
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, 
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”89 In other words, it is up 
to the legislature to determine whether the condemnation meets a 
public purpose. Furthermore, the Court determined that there is no 
need for the public to actually use the condemned property as long as 
the condemnation furthers a legitimate public purpose.90 
 Next, in Midkiff, a unanimous Supreme Court reaffirmed Ber-
man’s deferential approach to legislative judgments in declaring a 
public purpose. In Midkiff, the Court upheld a statute whereby fee ti-
tle was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees (for compensa-
tion) in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership.91 The 
Court concluded that the State’s purpose of eliminating the “social 
and economic evils of a land oligopoly” qualified as a valid public 
use.92 The Court further explained that “it is only the taking’s pur-
pose, and not its mechanics,” that matters in determining public 
use.93 Therefore, even if the State was taking property from one 
landowner and giving it to another, which traditionally was not al-
lowed under the public use clause, the purpose stated in Midkiff was 
found constitutional. 
 In Kelo, the Court relied principally on three factors to determine 
that economic revitalization constituted sufficient public use. First, 
the City had a carefully formulated economic development plan that 
it believed would provide appreciable benefits to the area, including 
new jobs and increased tax revenue:  
Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough de-
liberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our 
review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the 
challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but 
rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestiona-
bly serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the 
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.94 
 Next, the Court relied on the precedents embodied in Berman and 
Midkiff to dispense with petitioners’ arguments that economic devel-
                                                                                                                      
 89. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).  
 90. Id. The Court stated that it is solely up to Congress to determine how the property 
is to be used once it has determined that a public purpose has been established. Id. 
 91. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984). The Hawaii Housing 
Authority was required to hold a public hearing to determine whether the condemnation 
by the State “will effectuate the public purposes” of the Act. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
516-22 (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation). If so, acquisition of the land was thereby 
authorized. Id.   
  92. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42. 
  93. Id. at 244.  
  94. Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005). 
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opment does not qualify as a public use and that using eminent do-
main for economic development crosses the boundary between public 
and private takings.95 In Berman, the Court endorsed the purpose of 
transforming a blighted area into a “well-balanced” community 
through redevelopment.96 In Midkiff, the Court upheld the interest in 
breaking up a land oligopoly that “created artificial deterrents to the 
normal functioning of the State’s residential land market.”97 Accord-
ingly, the Court claimed “[i]t would be incongruous to hold that the 
City’s interest in the economic benefits to be derived from the devel-
opment of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a public character than 
any of those . . . interests,” and found “no basis for exempting eco-
nomic development from our traditionally broad understanding of 
public purpose.”98 Furthermore, “the government’s pursuit of a public 
purpose will often benefit individual private parties.”99 In rejecting 
the unconstitutionality of the idea that under the redevelopment 
plan land would be leased or sold to private developers for redevel-
opment, the Court acknowledged “ ‘[t]he public end may be as well or 
better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a 
department of government—or so the Congress might conclude. We 
cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the 
public purposes of community redevelopment projects.’ ”100 
 Finally, the Court restated its deference to federalism and state 
decisionmaking and decided not to second-guess the effectiveness of 
the City’s development plan or its determinations about what land is 
necessary to carry out the project.101 “ ‘When the legislature’s purpose 
is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear 
that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings . . . are not to be 
carried out in the federal courts.’ ”102 Accordingly, the Court found 
                                                                                                                      
  95. Id. at 2665-66. 
  96. Id. at 2665 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 26, 33). 
  97. Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242). 
  98. Id. at 2665-66. The City relied upon the Connecticut Legislature’s declaration of 
policy in municipal development projects:  
 It is found and declared that the economic welfare of the state depends upon 
the continued growth of industry and business within the state; that the acqui-
sition and improvement of unified land and water areas and vacated commer-
cial plants to meet the needs of industry and business should be in accordance 
with local, regional and state planning objectives . . . that permitting and as-
sisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and water areas . . . 
in distressed municipalities . . . are public uses and purposes for which public 
moneys may be expended; and that the necessity in the public interest for the 
provisions of this chapter is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determi-
nation. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-186 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Supplement). 
 99. Kelo II, 125 S. Ct. at 2666. 
 100. Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 34).  
 101. Id. at 2668.  
 102. Id. at 2667 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242). The Court diffused the parade of 
horribles argument by stating that the Takings Clause “ ‘operates as a conditional limita-
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that a rule requiring postponement of every condemnation pending 
judicial approval would be too burdensome on states in successfully 
implementing redevelopment plans.103 
 In her dissent, Justice O’Connor accused the majority of effec-
tively deleting the words “for public use” from the Takings Clause.104 
Although Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in Midkiff, her 
dissent here declared that if economic development meets the public 
use requirement, there is no longer a distinction between private and 
public use of property.105 
 Justice O’Connor explained that the exceptional circumstances in 
the cases cited by the majority warranted legislative deference. For 
example, the eradication of blight and slums in Berman and the 
elimination of oligopoly in Midkiff were cases where the “extraordi-
nary precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirma-
tive harm on society.”106 These rare circumstances clearly were not 
present in Kelo, and the majority’s application of such legislative def-
erence “significantly expands the meaning of public use.”107 
 Succinctly summarizing her opinion of the majority’s reasoning, 
Justice O’Connor declared, “Nothing is to prevent the State from re-
placing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping 
mall, or any farm with a factory.”108 Further, “[s]tates play many im-
portant functions in our system of dual sovereignty, but compensat-
ing for our refusal to enforce properly the Federal Constitution . . . is 
not among them.”109 
 Justice Thomas raised similar concerns in his dissent and agreed 
that the cases cited by the majority for the proposition that public 
use means public purpose rather than use by the public were excep-
tions to the rule.110 In fact, Justice Thomas characterized the Court’s 
proclaimed deferential standard as “deeply perverse” and urged the 
Court to return to the original meaning of the public use clause, from 
which the Court has clearly deviated.111 
                                                                                                                      
tion, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.’ ” Id. at 
2667 n.19 (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
Further, the Court refused to consider cases executed outside of an integrated development 
plan, simply stating that “the hypothetical cases . . . can be confronted if and when they 
arise.” Id. at 2667. Assuming that the City was exercising its power within its authority, 
the Court found no need to craft “an artificial restriction on the concept of public use.” Id. 
 103. Id. at 2668. 
 104. Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 2674.  
 107. Id. at 2675. 
 108. Id. at 2676. 
 109. Id. at 2677. 
 110. Id. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 2687. 
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 However, until the Court revisits this issue, it will be up to the 
states to decide whether to increase the burden on the government’s 
exercise of eminent domain. The majority’s “broader and more natu-
ral interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose’ ”112 no doubt sets a 
standard that can easily be met, at least in federal court, for most 
condemnation proceedings.  
TORTS—SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY—THE NEGLIGENCE OF AN ACTIVE 
TORTFEASOR SHOULD BE APPORTIONED TO THE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE 
PARTY UNDER FLORIDA’S COMPARATIVE FAULT STATUTE AND 
FLORIDA’S STATUTORY RESTRICTION ON THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INDEMNIFICATION PROVISION 
OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN A MUNICIPAL AGENCY AND A PRIVATE 
ENTITY—American Home Assurance Co. v. National Railroad Pas-
senger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2005).  
 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified four questions of 
Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court because there was no con-
trolling precedent for its pending case.113 The case originated in the 
federal district court for the Middle District of Florida, and the court 
of appeals consolidated several appeals for which the resolutions to 
the certified questions applied.114 
 The case arose out of an incident in which an Amtrak passenger 
train collided with a hauler rig stalled on the railroad tracks, damag-
ing the combustion turbine engine the rig was carrying.115 The Kis-
simmee Utility Authority (KUA) entered into an agreement with Flor-
ida Municipal Power Agency (FMPA) for fifty percent of the ownership 
of an electric power plant and to share electricity production costs.116 
KUA then entered into a crossing agreement with CSX Transportation 
(CSX) to construct, use, and maintain a road grade crossing over CSX’s 
tracks, so vehicles and people could cross over the tracks to the power 
plant.117 The agreement required KUA to “ ‘defend, indemnify, protect, 
and save [CSX] harmless from and against’ certain designated losses 
and casualties . . . [and] required KUA to indemnify any company 
whose property was operated by CSX at the railroad crossing.”118 
 KUA contracted with General Electric (GE) for the purchase and 
delivery of equipment for the plant.119 GE then contracted with Stew-
                                                                                                                      
 112. Id. at 2662 (majority opinion).  
 113. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 462-63 
(Fla. 2005). 
 114. Id. at 462. 
 115. Id. at 463-64. 
 116. Id. at 463. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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art & Stevenson Services, Inc. (S&S) to purchase and customize 
equipment for the power plant, who then contracted with Rountree 
Transport and Rigging, Inc. (“Rountree”) to transport the combustion 
turbine.120 As the Rountree transporters were adjusting the height of 
the rig on the tracks, the collision took place.121 A series of lawsuits 
ensued between the parties and their insurers.122 The district court 
separated the suit into a liability phase and a damages phase.123  
 Of the questions certified to the Florida Supreme Court, the first 
regarded a comparative fault issue, and the other three regarded in-
demnification agreements and sovereign immunity issues.124 The first 
question arose as a result of AHA’s argument to the Eleventh Circuit 
that its damages should not be limited under the comparative fault 
principles of section 768.81, Florida Statutes, particularly subsec-
tions (2) and (3).125 The statute codified the holding of Hoffman v. 
Jones,126 and “[n]othing in the legislative history of this statute indi-
cates an intention other than a direct codification of this Court’s 
adoption of comparative liability.”127 
 The first certified question, “Should a vicariously liable party have 
the negligence of the active tortfeasor apportioned to it under Florida 
Statute § 768.81 such that recovery of its own damages is reduced 
concomitantly?,”128 asks whether, under Florida’s comparative fault 
law, a vicariously liable party should have the active tortfeasor’s neg-
ligence apportioned to it.129  
 AHA argued that because “fault” is used, but neither it nor its 
subrogor were directly negligent, the comparative fault statute was 
inapplicable.130 The railroads, however, focused on the plain meaning 
of the word “chargeable” and contended that it is broad enough to in-
                                                                                                                      
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 463-64. 
 122. Id. at 464. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 462-63. 
 125. Section 768.81, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:  
    (2) Effect of contributory fault.—In an action to which this section applies, 
any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately 
the amount awarded as economic and noneconomic damages for an injury at-
tributable to the claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. 
    (3) Apportionment of damages.—In cases to which this section applies, the 
court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party’s 
percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several li-
ability . . . . 
FLA. STAT. § 768.81(2)-(3) (2005). 
 126. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). 
 127. Am. Home Assurance, 908 So. 2d at 469. 
 128. Id. at 466 (emphasis omitted). 
 129. Id. at 469. 
 130. Id. at 465-66. 
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clude vicariously liable parties.131 The court concluded in favor of the 
railroads, noting that AHA’s interpretation would render “charge-
able” as surplusage and that vicarious liability always involves liabil-
ity without fault but still carries the entire burden of the active tort-
feasor.132 Thus, the statute applied to vicariously liable parties, as 
well as active tortfeasors.133 Furthermore, it noted as a matter of pol-
icy, “it would be a dangerous precedent to allow insurers, through 
subrogation, to have a greater right to damages than their insur-
eds.”134 
 The court then ruled on the second certified question: “Given that 
Kissimmee Utility Authority, a municipal agency under Florida law, 
agreed by contract to indemnify a private party, is the agreement 
controlled by the restrictions on waiver of sovereign immunity found 
in Florida Statute § 768.28?”135 Before this statute was enacted, the 
state and counties were immune from tort liability, but municipali-
ties were not immune.136 However, municipalities were still included 
within the definition of “state agencies or subdivisions” within this 
statute. 
 When the legislature abrogates the state’s sovereign immunity, 
which the Florida Constitution gives it the power to do, the waiver 
must be “clear and unequivocal,” must be “strictly construe[d]” by the 
Court, and will not be found as a product of inference or implica-
tion.137 In light of this, the court concluded that the indemnification 
provision, in which “KUA agreed to assume responsibility for the 
negligence of CSX and its employees and for that of companies affili-
ated with CSX . . . [and] placed no limit on the amount KUA has to 
pay out per claimant and per accident,” was based on a disagreement 
over breach of contract, so the waiver for tort liability did not ap-
                                                                                                                      
 131. Id. at 466. 
 132. Id. at 471. 
 133. Id. at 470-71. 
 134. Id. at 471. 
 135. Id. at 467 (emphasis omitted). Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, provides in perti-
nent part: 
 In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself 
and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for li-
ability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Actions at law 
against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in 
tort for money damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for in-
jury or loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision while 
acting within the scope of the employee’s office or employment under circum-
stances in which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this 
state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act. 
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (2005). 
 136. Am. Home Assurance, 908 So. 2d at 472. 
 137. Id. 
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ply.138 Thus, KUA’s payout was not limited by subsection (5) of the 
statute, which allows $100,000 per claimant and $200,000 per acci-
dent.139 Consequently, the court answered the second certified ques-
tion in the negative.140 
 Justice Quince, who concurred in part and dissented in part, re-
jected this conclusion stating, “While the crossing agreement is a 
contract, the provision at issue clearly relates to tort liability.”141 This 
is problematic because then the state can contract to do what it does 
not otherwise have the power to do, “i.e., waive sovereign immunity 
for tort liability beyond the limits specified by the Legislature in sec-
tion 768.28.”142 Quince further emphasized that if a government en-
tity cannot indemnify a second government entity for the second’s 
negligence without express statutory authorization, then it does not 
follow that the first government entity should be able to indemnify a 
private party for its negligence.143 Thus, Quince reasoned that the in-
demnity clause between KUA and CSX should be limited by the re-
strictions in section 768.28, Florida Statutes.144  
 Quince’s position highlighted that the majority decision may allow 
the governmental entities to circumvent the law, which would then 
essentially render the law meaningless. Justice Cantero’s concur-
                                                                                                                      
 138. Id. at 473. 
 139. Id. at 474. Section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes, provides: 
  The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the 
period before judgment. Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall 
be liable to pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the 
sum of $100,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when to-
taled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or 
subdivisions arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of 
$200,000. However, a judgment or judgments may be claimed and rendered in 
excess of these amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to 
$100,000 or $200,000, as the case may be; and that portion of the judgment 
that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be 
paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature. Notwithstanding 
the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided herein, the state or an 
agency or subdivision thereof may agree, within the limits of insurance cover-
age provided, to settle a claim made or a judgment rendered against it without 
further action by the Legislature, but the state or agency or subdivision thereof 
shall not be deemed to have waived any defense of sovereign immunity or to 
have increased the limits of its liability as a result of its obtaining insurance 
coverage for tortious acts in excess of the $100,000 or $200,000 waiver provided 
above. The limitations of liability set forth in this subsection shall apply to the 
state and its agencies and subdivisions whether or not the state or its agencies 
or subdivisions possessed sovereign immunity before July 1, 1974.  
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (2005). 
 140. Am. Home Assurance, 908 So. 2d at 474. 
 141. Id. at 480 (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 480-81. 
 144. Id. at 482. 
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rence noted, in a historical overview of sovereign immunity, that the 
dissent’s position may have merit in a discussion regarding a state 
and its agencies but emphasized that position “ignores the broad 
powers conferred on municipalities to ‘exercise any power for munici-
pal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.’ ”145 Further-
more, Cantero pointed out that the statute granted immunity to mu-
nicipalities where they previously had none, so this derogation of 
common law must be strictly construed.146 Because the statute actu-
ally granted the municipalities immunity above the common law lim-
its but granted states immunity up to specified limits, the statute 
“must be construed in favor of granting immunity to the state, but 
against granting it to a municipality.”147 
 The court then turned to the third certified question, which also 
regarded sovereign immunity: “Is the indemnification agreement in-
stead controlled by the rule for breach-of-contract actions enunciated 
in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections?”148 This case 
held that the state is not immune from contracts that it enters into 
because the contracts should be binding and enforceable on both par-
ties.149  
 The court distinguished that case from the present one because 
Pan-Am involved a state and the present case involves a municipal-
ity, which has the power to execute contracts and be liable for its 
breach.150 This power stems from Florida’s Constitution, which “gives 
municipalities ‘governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to 
enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal 
functions and render municipal services . . . except as otherwise pro-
vided by law,’ ”151 and the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, which 
recognizes the same powers that are limited only when “expressly 
prohibited by law.”152 
 The court concluded that even before Pan-Am, KUA and other 
municipalities already had the power to execute contracts.153 It also 
noted that even if KUA did need express authorization to execute the 
crossing agreement, section 163.01(15)(k), Florida Statutes,154 pro-
                                                                                                                      
 145. Id. at 477 (Cantero, J., concurring) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1993)). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 478. 
 148. Id. at 467 (majority opinion) (emphasis and citation omitted). 
 149. Id. at 474. 
 150. Id. at 474-75. 
 151. Id. at 475 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b)). 
 152. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1997)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. This provision provides: 
   (15) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or of any other law 
except s. 361.14, any public agency of this state which is an electric utility, or 
any separate legal entity created pursuant to the provisions of this section, the 
membership of which consists only of electric utilities, and which exercises or 
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vided express authorization.155 Thus, KUA could not invoke sovereign 
immunity to relieve itself from liability under the contract.156 
 The dissent agreed with the majority that KUA had the authority 
to contract for municipal services, including the crossing agree-
ment.157 “However, both the constitutional provision and the Munici-
pal Home Rule Powers Act recognize that the powers of a municipal-
ity may be limited when ‘otherwise provided by law.’ ”158 Thus, even 
though KUA had authority to contract, it did not have the authority 
to extend the government’s liability beyond section 768.28 by chang-
ing the indemnity agreement.159 Pan-Am held that a state agency 
could not claim a sovereign immunity defense in a breach of contract 
action based on a written contract that the state had authority to en-
ter.160 Thus, because KUA did not have authority to enter into the in-
demnity agreement provision of the contract, the indemnity agree-
ment was not controlled by Pan-Am.161 The dissent, like the majority, 
answered the third question in the negative but under this different 
reasoning.162 
 Because the third question was answered in the negative, the 
fourth question (“If Pan-Am applies, does a municipal agency like 
Kissimmee Utility Authority lose the protection of sovereign immu-
nity only if it has specific statutory authorization to enter into in-
demnification agreements, or is it sufficient that the agency more 
generally has statutory authorization to contract with private par-
ties?”) was not addressed.163 
                                                                                                                      
proposes to exercise the powers granted by part II of chapter 361, the Joint 
Power Act, may exercise any or all of the following powers: 
 . . . . 
  (k) The limitations on waiver in the provisions of s. 768.28 or any other law to 
the contrary notwithstanding, the Legislature, in accordance with s. 13, Art. X 
of the State Constitution, hereby declares that any such legal entity or any 
public agency of this state that participates in any electric project waives its 
sovereign immunity to: 
 1. All other persons participating therein; and 
 2. Any person in any manner contracting with a legal entity of which any such 
public agency is a member, with relation to: 
 a. Ownership, operation, or any other activity set forth in sub-subparagraph 
(b)2.d. with relation to any electric project; or  
 b. The supplying or purchasing of services, output, capacity, energy, or any 
combination thereof. 
FLA. STAT. § 163.01(15). 
 155. Am. Home Assurance, 908 So. 2d at 476. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 481 (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 482. 
 160. Id. at 479. 
 161. Id. at 481-82. 
 162. Id. at 482. 
 163. Id. at 463, 467, 476 n.6 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted). 
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 Upon answering the certified questions, the court returned the 
case to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for disposition.164 The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion based on these 
answers, holding that the district court properly assigned the fault of 
the active tortfeasor to the subrogee in accordance with the Florida 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that section 768.81, Florida Statutes, 
applied to vicariously liable parties.165 Also, in combination with fur-
ther reasoning by the Eleventh Circuit, the Florida Supreme Court’s 
answers to the second and third questions led the Eleventh Circuit to 
conclude that the indemnification provision of the contract was 
valid.166 
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE—APPEAL AND ERROR—PLAINTIFF HAS AN 
ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO AMEND A COMPLAINT ONCE AS A MATTER OF 
COURSE BEFORE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING IS SERVED AND A TRIAL 
COURT HAS NO DISCRETION TO DENY SUCH AN AMENDMENT; A 
DEFENDANT MAY ASSERT AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, INCLUDING THE 
DEFENSE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION, IN A MOTION TO DISMISS; AND AN 
APPELLATE COURT MAY, IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, IMPOSE 
SANCTIONS ON AN APPELLEE OR ITS LAWYER FOR FRIVOLOUS DEFENSE 
OF A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS TRIAL COURT ORDER—Boca Burger, Inc. 
v. Forum (Boca Burger II), 912 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2005).  
 The Florida Supreme Court used its discretionary jurisdiction 
pursuant to article III, section 3, subsection (b)(3) of the Florida Con-
stitution167 to resolve a conflict between the Second and Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal concerning “whether a trial court has discretion 
to deny a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint once before a re-
sponsive pleading is served.”168 In Volpicella v. Volpicella, the Second 
District held that under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure “a party 
may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time be-
fore a responsive pleading is served” but also noted that “[t]his rule 
has not yet been construed as depriving a trial court of discretion to 
withhold leave to amend a pleading to which no response has been 
served.”169 Subsequently, in Forum v. Boca Burger, Inc. (Boca Burger 
                                                                                                                      
 164. Id. at 476.  
 165. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. Rountree Transp. & Rigging, Inc., 422 
F.3d 1275, 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 166. Id. at 1283, 1285. 
 167. That subsection provides that the Florida Supreme Court: 
  May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares 
valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a provision of the state or fed-
eral constitution, or that expressly affects a class of constitutional or state offi-
cers, or that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district 
court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law. 
FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3(b)(3). 
 168. Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum (Boca Burger II), 912 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 2005).  
 169. 136 So. 2d 231, 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). 
2005]                          RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 547 
 
I), the Fourth District noted that although the Volpicella decision 
“[found] a residual discretion in the trial judge to deny leave to 
amend when sought by a party before the filing of a responsive plead-
ing,” it “doubt[ed] the correctness of the second district’s assertion of 
residual discretion [because] Rule 1.190(a) [Florida Rules of Civil 
Procedure] states a rule, not a discretion, as regards to amending be-
fore a responsive pleading is filed.”170  
 Additionally, the court held that by accepting jurisdiction to re-
view the conflict between the districts, it also had “authority to ad-
dress other issues properly raised.”171 Thus, the court also addressed 
the issues of whether a defendant may assert an affirmative defense, 
specifically the defense of federal preemption, in a motion to dismiss 
and whether “an appellate court may . . . impose sanctions on an ap-
pellee or its lawyer for its frivolous defense of a patently erroneous 
trial court order.”172 This Note first briefly outlines the procedural 
history preceding the court’s decision and then examines the court’s 
treatment of the above issues in the order presented.  
 Forum filed an action against Boca Burger, Inc. for declaratory 
judgment, injunctive relief, and damages under the Florida Decep-
tive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.173 “Boca Burger filed a motion to 
dismiss with prejudice, arguing that Forum’s complaint failed to 
state a cause of action and was otherwise preempted by federal and 
[Florida] law” and subsequently scheduled a hearing.174 On the day of 
the hearing, Forum filed an amended complaint without leave of 
court,175 alleging additional statutory and common law violations.176 
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial judge refused to 
recognize the amended complaint as filed and granted Boca Burger’s 
motion to dismiss the original complaint with prejudice on the 
grounds that the claims were preempted by federal and Florida 
law.177 Forum appealed the trial court’s decision, and on appeal the 
Fourth District reversed, holding that the “essential problem” with 
Boca Burger’s argument that Forum’s claims were preempted by fed-
                                                                                                                      
 170. 788 So. 2d 1055, 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).  
 171. Boca Burger II, 912 So. 2d at 563 (citing its previous decision in Savoie v. State, 
422 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1982), for the proposition that “once the Supreme Court accepts 
jurisdiction over a case to resolve the legal issue in conflict, it may, in its discretion, con-
sider other issues properly raised and argued before the Supreme Court”).  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 563-64. 
 175. Id. at 564. The amended complaint was filed by “new (though not substitute) 
counsel.” Id. The trial judge expressed two problems with the amended complaint: “[T]he 
complaint had been amended without leave of court, and the lawyer at the hearing was not 
the lawyer who had signed the original complaint on the plaintiff’s behalf.” Boca Burger I, 
788 So. 2d at 1058. 
 176. Boca Burger II, 912 So. 2d at 564. 
 177. Id. at 565. 
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eral law was that the argument was “raised at the wrong time, under 
the auspices of the wrong motion.”178 The Fourth District reasoned 
that “the pre-emption defense is an avoidance, not a real defense, 
[that] should be pleaded as an affirmative defense and resolved . . . 
on motion for summary judgment.”179 Regarding the trial court’s de-
cision to dismiss Forum’s complaint, the Fourth District held: 
A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any 
time before a responsive pleading is served. With the case having 
proceeded only as far as the filing of an original complaint and a 
motion to dismiss, the [trial] court had no discretion to refuse to 
accept the new pleading.180 
Further, the Fourth District found that “Boca Burger’s counsel mis-
led the trial court into believing that it had discretion to refuse Fo-
rum’s amended complaint,” concluded that “counsel could not have 
made such an argument in good faith at either the trial or appellate 
levels,” and “imposed trial and appellate court sanctions against 
Boca Burger’s counsel.”181 Boca Burger appealed the Fourth District’s 
decision.  
 On review, the Florida Supreme Court first pointed to the plain 
language of Rule 1.190(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which provides: 
A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any 
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action 
has not been placed on the trial calendar, may so amend it at any 
time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of 
the adverse party. If a party files a motion to amend a pleading, 
the party shall attach the proposed amended pleading to the mo-
tion. Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires. 
A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading unless the court other-
wise orders.182 
The court reasoned that “by its terms the rule provides for amend-
ment of as right (first sentence) and amendment by agreement or 
leave of court (second sentence), depending on the circumstances.”183 
                                                                                                                      
 178. Boca Burger I, 788 So. 2d at 1061. 
 179. Id. at 1062 (citing FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.110(d) in support of its holding). 
 180. Id. at 1057. The Fourth District emphasized that “[a] motion to dismiss is not a 
‘responsive pleading’ because it is not even a pleading.” Id. (citing FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.100(a), 
which designates permissible pleadings, provides that “[n]o other pleadings shall be al-
lowed,” and does not include a motion to dismiss in its list of permissible pleadings).  
 181. Boca Burger II, 912 So. 2d at 565.  
 182. Id. at 566-67 (quoting FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.190(a)). 
 183. Id. at 567. 
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The court acknowledged that the first sentence of Rule 1.190(a) 
“grants plaintiffs an automatic right to amend the complaint once be-
fore a responsive pleading is served.”184 Further, the court held that 
“the filing of a motion to dismiss does not terminate a plaintiff’s abso-
lute right to amend the complaint once as a matter of course” as “a 
motion to dismiss is not a ‘responsive pleading’ because it is not a 
‘pleading’ under the rules.”185 Applying these principles to the deci-
sion under review, the court held: 
Because Boca Burger had not served its answer, and had only filed 
a motion to dismiss, Forum had the right to file an amended com-
plaint, even if that amendment was filed on the day of—or even 
just before—the hearing on Boca Burger’s motion to dismiss the 
original complaint.186 
 Next, the court clarified the time at which a judge’s discretion to 
deny amendment of a complaint arises:  
 A judge’s discretion to deny amendment of a complaint arises 
only after the defendant files an answer or if the plaintiff already 
has exercised the right to amend once. At that time, the second 
and fourth sentences of rule 1.190(a) apply: “Otherwise a party 
may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent 
of the adverse party. . . . Leave of court shall be given freely when 
justice so requires.”187 
The court noted several cases that have acknowledged a court’s dis-
cretion to deny amendment of a complaint but clarified that all these 
cases “concerned either a plaintiff’s second (or subsequent) amend-
ment or an amendment requested after the answer was filed.”188 Con-
sequently, the court approved the Fourth District’s holding that “a 
court has no discretion to deny an amendment under the first sen-
tence of the rule” and disapproved Volpicella “to the extent it holds 
that a trial court retains any discretion to deny an amendment under 
[the first sentence of the rule]—regardless of whether the plaintiff 
simply files an amended complaint or requests leave of court to file 
one.”189 
                                                                                                                      
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. (“The rule clearly grants a plaintiff one free amendment to perfect the com-
plaint before an answer is served.”).  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 567-68 (citing Fla. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. State, 832 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2002); Dimick v. Ray, 774 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Kohn v. City of Miami 
Beach, 611 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Bouldin v. Okaloosa County, 580 So. 2d 205 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Adams v. Knabb Turpentine Co., 435 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); 
and Highlands County Sch. Bd. v. K.D. Hedin Constr., Inc., 382 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1980) as examples). 
 189. Id. at 568. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Quince, Justice Lewis argued 
that the majority and the Fourth District incorrectly determined that this case turned on 
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 As discussed above, in accepting jurisdiction to resolve a conflict 
between the district courts of appeal, the supreme court has discre-
tion to address other issues properly raised on appeal,190 and in the 
instant case, the court used its discretionary jurisdiction to address 
the issue of whether a defendant may assert an affirmative defense, 
specifically the defense of federal preemption, in a motion to dis-
miss.191 In overruling the Fourth District’s holding “that Boca Burger 
could only plead the preemption defense as an affirmative defense, 
and therefore the issue could only be resolved on motion for summary 
judgment,”192 the court reasoned that “the issue of federal preemption 
is a question of subject matter jurisdiction [and that] lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction may be properly asserted in a motion to dis-
miss.”193 Thus, the court held that “[a] defendant may, at its option, 
raise any affirmative defense, including the defense of federal pre-
emption, in a motion to dismiss.”194  
 Additionally, the court used its discretionary jurisdiction to ad-
dress the issue of whether an appellate court may impose sanctions 
on an appellee or its lawyer for its frivolous defense of a patently er-
roneous trial court order. As previously discussed, the Fourth Dis-
trict imposed sanctions on Boca Burger for advocating, at both the 
trial and appellate levels, that the trial court had discretion to deny 
Forum’s amendment of the original complaint. The court noted that 
the trial court had not imposed sanctions for Boca Burger’s actions 
and held that “no authority exists for an appellate court’s imposition 
of sanctions for conduct occurring in the trial court.”195 Conversely, 
the court held that, on appeal, “a district court may, in appropriate 
circumstances, impose sanctions for counsel’s defense of a patently 
erroneous order [in front of the appellate court].”196 However, the 
                                                                                                                      
law applicable to “a simple and routine filing of an amended complaint,” as the amendment 
to the complaint at issue was far from routine as it contained “a multitude of defects and 
failures to follow the Rules of Judicial Administration.” Id. at 581 (Lewis, J., dissenting) 
(indicating defects of the amendment, such as the fact that the signatures on the complaint 
were not those of Forum’s attorney of record).  
 190. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 191. Boca Burger II, 912 So. 2d at 568 (majority opinion). 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. (citing FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.140(b) as supporting authority) (citations omitted).  
 194. Id. However, the court noted that “when a defendant asserts such a defense in a 
motion to dismiss, a trial court must determine the issue as a matter of law based only on 
the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, assuming the truth of the facts asserted.” Id. 
  In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Quince, Justice Lewis argued that “[t]he ques-
tion seized upon by the district court as to how preemption is to be presented (motion to 
dismiss or affirmative defense) was never asserted, discussed, or preserved for appellate 
consideration.” Id. at 582 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. at 569 (majority opinion) (“If the district court was concerned with counsel’s 
conduct in the trial court, the proper procedure would have been to remand for the circuit 
court to allow the trial court to determine for itself whether to impose sanctions.”).  
 196. Id. 
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court found that the record lacked sufficient information for it to de-
termine “how much, if any, of the district court’s decision was based 
on counsel’s conduct on appeal” and, therefore, determined that the 
proper outcome was to remand the case to the Fourth District for the 
court to determine whether sanctions for Boca Burger’s, or its coun-
sel’s, conduct before the Fourth District are appropriate.197  
 Additionally, the court provided guidance as to what constitutes 
“appropriate circumstances” for imposing sanctions.198 The court 
noted that recent revisions to section 57.105, Florida Statutes, 
greatly expand a litigant’s ability to obtain sanctions against an op-
ponent who raises unsupported claims or defenses.199 Further the 
court found that, “as a matter of law,” section 57.105, Florida Stat-
utes, is not limited in applicability to appellants.200 Thus, even 
though  
                                                                                                                      
 197. Id. at 574 (“If [on remand] the district court does impose sanctions, it should state 
clearly whether its sanctions are to be imposed against Boca Burger itself, its counsel, or 
both” and that the Fourth District “may also remand to the trial court [so that the trial 
court can determine] whether to impose sanctions for conduct that occurred in that court”). 
The court instructed that, on remand, the district court should “reconsider its order impos-
ing sanctions, addressing only conduct on appeal.” Id.  
 In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Quince, Justice Lewis took issue with the ma-
jority’s failure to consider the trial court record and argued:  
The transcript of the trial level hearing and the form of the dismissal with 
prejudice belies the district court’s analysis and that of the majority with re-
gard to the Rule of Civil Procedure being the controlling issue in the trial court 
and demonstrates that the dismissal represented an arguable decision by the 
trial court on the substance of the core claim and defense, correctly or incor-
rectly, which remains as an arguable controlling issue. As recognized by the 
majority, the issue of preemption is fundamental to the power of the court to 
act and is a question of subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised at any 
time. In my view, on these facts and Florida law at that time, it was not sanc-
tionable for this attorney to attempt to support the trial judge’s decision with 
regard to the judicial administration rules or to assert a lack of jurisdiction due 
to preemption as a matter of law. Although the majority proclaims that today it 
has not punished counsel, it has returned this case to the district court of ap-
peal for consideration to do so tomorrow, as a result that is, in my view, incor-
rect as a matter of law and accompanied by the incorrect concepts that the trial 
level proceedings are “moot,” the propriety of a court’s decision is irrelevant to 
the consideration of punishment of a party due to the position it asserts, and 
the announced basis of a court’s order is unimportant in analyzing whether an 
order is “patently erroneous.” This case has simply become misdirected and 
should not be remanded for sanctions, but returned to the trial court for the 
case to proceed. 
Id. at 584 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
 198. Id. at 569-74 (majority opinion). 
 199. Id. at 569-71 (holding that under the revised version of section 57.105, Florida 
Statutes, sanctions are available upon a showing “that the party and counsel ‘knew or 
should have known’ that any claim or defense asserted was (a) not supported by the facts 
or (b) not supported by an application of ‘then-existing’ law”). 
 200. Id. at 570 (analyzing section 57.105, Florida Statutes, and holding that “an appel-
lee is not shielded as a matter of law from the imposition of sanctions in an appropriate 
case”).  
552  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:527 
 
an appellee, by definition, is defending an order of the trial court 
[and] [a]ppellate courts, therefore, should impose sanctions against 
an appellee only in rare circumstances. . . . [A]n appellee cannot 
hide behind the “presumption of correctness” of an order that the 
appellee itself procured by misrepresenting the law or the facts.201 
 Finally, the court found that appellate counsel “has an independ-
ent ethical obligation to present both the facts and the applicable law 
accurately and forthrightly” and noted that this obligation “will 
sometimes require appellate counsel to concede error where, al-
though trial counsel obtained a favorable result, either the facts were 
not as represented to the trial court or the law is clearly contrary to 
the appellee’s position and no good-faith basis exists to argue that it 
should be changed.”202 However, the court clarified that this ethical 
obligation does not require “appellate counsel [to] concede error 
[based on] the statistical chances for reversal.”203 Instead, counsel 
must concede error only where defending the trial court’s ruling 
would be tantamount to defending an “indefensible” order.204 Not-
withstanding the court’s explicit holding, it remains to be seen how 
often Florida attorneys will erroneously request sanctions against 
appellees who are legitimately defending a trial court’s order because 
they believe the court’s order to be patently erroneous.  
                                                                                                                      
 201. Id. at 571 (“The presumption of correctness is necessarily based on another pre-
sumption: that the appellee correctly informed the trial court of the facts and applicable 
law.”).  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. This ruling responded to Boca Burger’s argument that “adopting a rule allow-
ing sanctions against appellees will require ‘the extreme, indeed unprofessional act, of 
throwing in the towel when there is any chance that an order may be reversed on appeal.’ ” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 204. Id. In support of this ruling, the court cited Florida decisions for the proposition 
that an attorney’s obligation to pursue his or her client’s lawful objectives cannot be used 
to “justify unprofessional conduct by elevating the perceived duty to zealously represent 
over all other duties.” Id. (citing Lingle v. Dion, 776 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001)). Additionally, the court referenced section 57.105, Florida Statutes, the Florida Bar 
rules of professional conduct, and the oath of admission to the Florida Bar as warnings 
“that counsel must be governed by considerations other than mere zealous advocacy for the 
client.” Id. at 571-72. Further, the court cited twenty-six published opinions since the be-
ginning of 2004 in which the state of Florida has conceded error on appeal, id. at 572 n.5, 
and thirteen published opinions since the beginning of 2003 in which civil litigants have 
conceded error on appeal, id. at 572 n.6, and reasoned that “the sheer number of such cases 
demonstrates that not only do the rules require counsel to concede error in appropriate 
cases [but also that] counsel can and do adhere to these rules in practice.” Id. at 572. Fi-
nally, the court excerpted a portion of the Fourth District’s opinion concerning the “law-
yer’s duty of candor to a tribunal” in support of its holding that conceding error on appeal 
is professional:  
Even if it hurts the strategy and tactics of a party’s counsel, even if it prepares 
the way for an adverse ruling, even though the adversary has himself failed to 
cite the correct law, the lawyer is required to disclose law favoring his adver-
sary when the court is obviously under an erroneous impression as to the law’s 
requirements. 
Id. at 573. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—TAXATION—FLORIDA STATUTE PROHIBITING 
ASSESSMENT OF VALUE FOR THE TAX YEAR ON REAL PROPERTY 
IMPROVEMENTS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED ON JANUARY 1 
COMPORTS WITH THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION’S JUST VALUATION 
REQUIREMENT—Sunset Harbour Condominium Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 
So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2005). 
 Recently the Florida Supreme Court held that section 192.042(1), 
Florida Statutes, which prohibits assessment of value on real prop-
erty improvements “not substantially completed on January 1,”205 
comports with the Florida Constitution’s just valuation require-
ment.206 In making this determination, the court differentiated be-
tween assessment statutes that exempt certain real property from a 
fair market valuation and statutes that merely delay a fair market 
valuation.207  
 The Florida Constitution requires that all property be assessed a 
just valuation for the purposes of determining appropriate ad valo-
rem taxation.208 It provides for only five exceptions to this rule, relat-
ing to matters of agricultural land, certain types of personal tangible 
property related to trade and livestock, homestead exemptions, his-
toric properties, and additional homestead exemptions regarding im-
provements to land for the purpose of serving certain family mem-
bers.209 The Florida Constitution further charges the legislature with 
determining the manner in which the “just valuation” is assessed.210 
Just valuation, for the purposes of this context, is synonymous with 
“fair market value.”211 
 Sunset Harbour Condominium (“Sunset”) was in its final phase of 
construction as of January 1, 1997.212 The local property appraiser 
(Robbins) determined that the construction was “substantially com-
plete” and assessed the property at a value of nearly $23 million.213 
When Sunset’s owners association filed suit to challenge Robbins’ de-
termination that the construction was “substantially complete,” 
                                                                                                                      
 205. The relevant provision reads: 
  All property shall be assessed according to its just value as follows: 
   (1) Real property, on January 1 of each year. Improvements or portions not 
substantially completed on January 1 shall have no value placed thereon. 
“Substantially completed” shall mean that the improvement or some self-
sufficient unit within it can be used for the purpose for which it was con-
structed.  
FLA. STAT. § 192.042 (2005). 
 206. Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 927 (2005).  
 207. Id. at 931 (citing Culbertson v. Seacoast Towers E., Inc., 212 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1968)). 
 208. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.  
 209. Id. § 4(a)-(e). 
 210. Id. § 4. 
 211. Sunset Harbour, 914 So. 2d at 928 n.4. 
 212. Id. at 927. 
 213. Id. The exact amount of the assessment was $22,935,100. Id.  
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rather than defend his determination, Robbins instead argued that 
section 192.042’s requirement of substantial completion was uncon-
stitutional in that it prevented a just valuation of the condomin-
ium.214 Both the trial and the appellate courts agreed with Robbins.215 
 The Florida Supreme Court, however, disagreed.216 Robbins 
largely relied on Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder.217 The 
statute at issue in Interlachen required that “ ‘platted lands unsold 
as lots shall be valued for tax assessment purposes on the same basis 
as any unplatted acreage of similar character until 60 percent of such 
lands included in one plat shall have been sold as individual lots.’ ”218 
In holding that statute unconstitutional, the Interlachen court 
stated, “ ‘It is true that the constitutional provision allows the Legis-
lature to prescribe regulations for the purpose of securing a just 
valuation of all property, but such regulations must apply to all 
property and not to any one particular class.’ ”219 By taxing similar 
property differently based upon ownership—that is, the plotted land 
was assessed at its fair market value if it was sold, but assessed as 
without value if not sold—the statute, in essence, created a regime 
that granted developers (owners of vast tracks of unsold plotted 
lands) a low assessment on the same property that was given a fair 
market assessment to individual home owners.220 In short, the stat-
ute in Interlachen “did not permit a ‘just valuation’ of all property.”221 
 The Sunset court compared the statute in Interlachen with what it 
declared to be the more relevant precedent, Culbertson v. Seacoast 
Towers East, Inc.222 The Culbertson court, regarding a statute similar 
to the one at issue in Sunset, stated: 
 The statute constitutes only a temporary postponement of valua-
tion and assessment of incomplete improvements on real property 
provided the prescribed conditions are met on the annual assess-
ment date. The requirement is simply that the separate classifica-
tion of such property shall bear some reasonable relationship to 
the legislative power to prescribe regulations to secure a just 
evaluation of property. Factors analogous to those here involved 
                                                                                                                      
 214. Id. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. at 928. 
 217. Id. at 931 (citing Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 
1973)). 
 218. Id. (quoting Interlachen, 304 So. 2d at 434). 
 219. Id. (quoting Interlachen, 304 So. 2d at 434). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. at 929-30 (citing Culbertson v. Seacoast Towers East, Inc., 212 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 
1968)). 
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have in numerous instances been made the basis for special statu-
tory treatment.223 
The Sunset court similarly concluded that the present statute’s pro-
hibition against assessment of value to nonsubstantially completed 
improvements as merely determining the timing of when a fair mar-
ket assessment will be made.224 Although the Florida Constitution 
requires the legislature to secure a just valuation on all property, a 
requirement which the Interlachen statute ran afoul, it permits the 
method for achieving a just valuation, including the timing of the as-
sessment, to the legislature’s discretion.225 
 The Sunset court was also emphatic that the revisions of the Flor-
ida Constitution after the decision in Culbertson did not affect its 
holding.226 It specifically found “no basis to believe the 1968 revisions 
to the just valuation provision were intended by the drafters or the 
public to invalidate the substantial completion statute.”227 
 The Sunset court therefore found Culbertson’s rule to still be valid 
and enunciated that the statute directing that just valuation be 
withheld from an improvement to real property until the improve-
ment is substantially completed to be well within the legislature’s 
discretion granted by the Florida Constitution.228 Whereas the Inter-
lachen statute created a scheme where similar parcels of real prop-
erty were assessed (and therefore taxed) differently based upon who 
owned the property, the statute in Sunset uniformly taxed similar 
property (real property with undergoing improvements) the same 
way. The Sunset court also enunciated that the statute “prescribes 
reasonable guidelines for valuation of incomplete improvements for 
property tax purposes, which infuse uniformity and certainty in ad 
valorem taxation.”229 The court even suggested that “[t]he absence of 
a ‘substantial completion’ statute would only promote uncertainty 
and encourage litigation.”230 In conclusion, the rule in Sunset permits 
the legislature to temporarily delay the assessment of a fair market 
value on improved real property when its improvements are not sub-
stantially completed by January 1 of each year.231 
                                                                                                                      
 223. Id. (quoting Culbertson, 212 So. 2d at 647).  
 224. Id. at 931-32. 
 225. Id. at 932. 
 226. Id. at 930. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. at 932. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
